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Behavioural simulations in spot electricity markets
Albert Banal-Estañoly Augusto Rupérez Micola
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Abstract
We study the consistency of behavioural simulation methods used to model the operations
of wholesale electricity markets. We include di¤erent supply and demand representations and
propose the Experience-Weighted Attractions method (Camerer and Ho, 1999) to encompass several
behavioural paradigms. We compare the results across assumptions and to standard economic
theory predictions. The match is good under at and upward-slopping supply bidding, and also
for plausible demand elasticity assumptions. Learning is inuenced by the number of bids per
plant and the initial conditions. The simulations perform best under reinforcement learning, less
well under best-response and especially poorly under ctitious play. The overall conclusion is that
simulation assumptions are far from innocuous. We link their performance to underlying features,
and identify those that are better suited to model liberalised electricity markets.
1 Introduction
The electricity industry is undergoing fundamental changes leading to a more liberal regime and
the alteration of its business logic. As part of the process, vertically integrated utilities and simple
transfer pricing rules are substituted by sophisticated nancial trading arrangements. De-regulated
electricity markets feature imperfect competition, very low demand elasticity, discontinuously convex
supply functions, high-frequency repeated trading, several production tecnologies and high potential
for collusion (Wilson, 2002). As a result, prices in the new electricity hubs are volatile and often
characterised by strategic behaviour and learning, which poses new challenges both for the operations
and scholarly study of the industry.
Simulations have hence emerged as a natural way to study the operations of de-regulated electricity
markets. An important part of the literature employs behavioural methods, with rms modelled as
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interacting, boundedly-rational agents (see Marks, 2006; Weidlich and Veit, 2008 for surveys).1 The
literature includes models commissioned by large rms (e.g. Gaz de France, E.ON, Shell) and the UKs
Competition Commission as well as some calibrations of the US market, like the Electricity Market
Complex Adaptive System (EMCAS) (Macal and North, 2005) and the Agent-based Modeling of
Electricity Systems (AMES) (Sun and Tesfatsion, 2007).
One of the advantages of behavioural simulations is that they are tailored to t closely the oper-
ations in each industry. However, this is a disadvantage when it comes to understanding the factors
driving the results because there is no consensus on the techniques appropriate for each situation. As
a consequence, simulation results are often not comparable (Fagiolo et al., 2007) and these methods
are struggling to reach their full potential (e.g. Leombruni et al., 2006). First, some papers assume
that rms behave according to the reinforcement model while other papers use more complex forms
of behaviour like ctitious play or best response. Second, few papers specify the initial conditions.
Third, demand is assumed to be elastic in some cases and inelastic in others. Finally, several papers
use stepwise schedules to model the supply part of the market, while in others sellers bid linearly
increasing functions.
This paper explores the consistency of the behavioural simulation techniques used in the literature
to model the operations of the new wholesale electricity auctions. We investigate the e¤ects of the as-
sumptions on simulation outcomes and how these outcomes compare to simple, empirically-supported,
theoretical predictions. Specically, we cast light on whether the results are consistent with the stan-
dard claim that pivotal dynamics determine the relationship between competition and prices. A rm
is pivotal if the quantity demanded exceeds the sum of production capacities of all other rms and,
as a result, it is necessary to fulll demand. There is wide consensus on the importance of pivotal
dynamics in spot electricity markets. In our setting, all rms are pivotal when there are few of them
but none of them is pivotal if there are many of them. As a consequence, our theoretical results
predict that prices will be high under monopoly, will decrease with competition, drastically change at
a pivotal dynamics switching point, and will approach marginal costs beyond that point.
We adopt a stylised setting that allows us to include alternative implementations of demand, supply
and rm behaviour, which yield many of the literatures models as particular cases. Demand can be
inelastic or price-sensitive, with a wide range of levels and elasticity specications. Firms are allowed
to submit either at bids or increasing supply schedules, with single or multiple bids per plant. Firms
behaviour is governed by Camerer and Hos (1999) Experience-Weighted Attraction algorithm (EWA)
which includes reinforcement learning, ctitious play and best-response as particular cases and allows
for the specication of di¤erent initial conditions.
1This trend is part of a economic engineering approach (Roth, 2002). Behavioural simulations have also been used
to model competitive strategy (e.g. Denrell, 2004), innovation (e.g. Adner and Levinthal, 2001), nancial markets (e.g.
Noe et al. 2003; Pouget, 2007), or business organisation (e.g. Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2001). See Tesfatsion and Judd
(2006) and http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm for information about agent-based methods.
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Simulation outcomes are consistent with our theoretical predictions under at and supply function
bidding, and under several plausible elasticities. However, the performance of the simulations is
inuenced by the number of bids per plant and the initial conditions. The performance of ctitious
play is poor, and it is clearly outperformed by best-response and especially reinforcement learning. The
results call into question a large part of the extant behavioural electricity research and can potentially
enhance the practical implementation of these techniques in the operation of the energy industry. We
also nd some evidence suggesting that experimental research can help us identify the most suitable
assumptions in market simulations. Weighted ctitious play, and especially power choice rules and
regret-feedback models improve over some of the standard models.
This paper is part of a new literature examining the consistency of behavioural simulations in
various de-regulated market settings (e.g. Fagiolo et al., 2007; Leombruni et al., 2007; Marks, 2007;
and Midgley et al., 2007). In the electricity industry, we are only aware of two related working papers.
Li et al. (2009) check the robustness of several reinforcement learning parameters, elasticity, and
price caps in the AMES model, and Kimbrough and Murphy (2009) compare step and supply function
bidding in a stylised setting. The question of validation, that is which models best t real market
data, is complementary to ours. Our approach mainly focuses on theoretical reliability, and includes
comparisons of demand, supply, and behavioural specications.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In part 2 we discuss the literature. In part 3,
we present our framework and the alternative implementations of demand, supply and rm behaviour.
In part 4 we derive the theoretical prediction. Part 5 includes the simulation results and we conclude
in part 6. All proofs are in the supplementary material.
2 Behavioural electricity modelling alternatives
The three main sets of assumptions in behavioural electricity simulations are the representation of
supply, demand, behavioural rules. This section is a survey of the choices made in existing work. In
Table 1 we classify some of the most relevant papers.
2.1 Supply bidding
Bertrand and Bertrand with capacity constraints are generally not considered suitable in the electricity
literature because they do not t the uniform pricing prevalent in power pools. Cournot quantity
bidding is sometimes used as an alternative (e.g. Bunn and Oliveira, 2007 and 2008; Veit et al., 2006).
However, a recurrent argument is that Cournot is also unsuitable because in real pools generators are
allowed to submit multiple at bids for sections of their capacity. Hence, most papers use either von
der Fehr and Harbords (1993) stepwise auctions, or Green and Newberys (1992) adaptation of the
supply function" (SF) equilibrium due to Klemperer and Meyer (1989).
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In the stepwise approach, the market is a sealed-bid, multiple-unit auction. Generators simultane-
ously submit single prices at which they are willing to supply sections of their capacity. An indepen-
dent auctioneer ranks the bids according to their o¤er prices, intersects the demand and supply and
determines the system marginal price.
The stepwise literature includes both per plant and overall rm bidding models. Stepwise auction
papers with one bid per generator are more parsimonious and comparable to the theoretical literature.
Nicolaisen et. al. (2001) and Richter and Sheblé (1998) create models similar to those of auction
theory to study the structure and e¢ciency of electricity markets. Closer to industrial organisation,
Rupérez Micola and Bunn (2008) and Rupérez Micola et al. (2008) examine how horizontal and vertical
integration inuence the rms ability to exert market power. Nanduri and Das (2007) add a simple
electricity network. Bagnall and Smith (2005) study how their model replicates human behaviour in
the England and Wales market.
Others allow one bid per plant. Bower and Bunn (2000, 2001) simulate the transition between the
British pool and the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) and how this could a¤ect market
prices. Bunn and Martoccia (2005) also replicate the UK market and Bower et al. (2001) focus on
Germany. Only García et al. (2005) and Banal-Estanol and Rupérez Micola (2009) include abstract
models with multiple stepwise bids per plant.
Inherent inexibilities in the operation of nuclear assets (e.g. safety concerns, very low marginal
costs and high start-up and loss of volume costs) prompt generators to submit at schedules at very
low prices for each plant. However, the assumption is quite restrictive in comparison to most bid-based
electricity markets where they can submit many bid steps per plant. Multi-bidding leads to the well-
known hockey stick shape of the supply curve, with base-load plants submitting at schedules and
peak-load generators o¤ering steeper step functions. Accordingly, a number of simulations include
several bids per plant. For example, Day and Bunn (2001) and Bunn and Day (2009) developed
detailed models of the England and Wales pool between 1990 and 2001. Bunn and Oliveira (2001,
2003) look into the related e¤ect of NETAs introduction and test whether the incumbents could
inuence prices. However, these models are often computationally cumbersome fo two reasons. First,
the algorithms operations grow with the number of bids. Second, rms coordination is more di¢cult,
which complicates learning and the convergence to a steady state.
The SF approach approximates actual bids with increasing supply functions relating quantities
and prices. This is a compromise between providing realism and simplifying the simulation mechanics.
Banal-Estanol and Rupérez Micola (2009) include an SF model with two stepwise bids per rm.
Cincotti et al (2005) study the e¤ect of market microstructure and costs on prices, and Visudhiphan
and Ilic (1999) focus on dynamic learning. Day and Bunn (2001, 2009) propose an even more exible
approach in which rms submit several SF sections per plant.
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However, the presence of multiple equilibria complicates the comparison of simulation and equi-
librium results. For example, the SF model has little predictive value if variation in demand is small
because almost anything between the Cournot and the competitive solution can be supported in equi-
librium (see Bolle 1992). Further, the solution is undened if there is no short-run demand elasticity
(von der Fehr and Harbord, 1998). Similarly, there are often many non-Pareto ranked equilibria in
stepwise auction settings (e.g. von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993; Crawford et al., 2006).
2.2 Demand representation
The current literature mostly represents demands with double-sided call auctions or xed aggregated
curves. First, double-sided call auctions consist of supply and demand bidding and common valuations
bounded between marginal cost and redemption values. Bids represent the price at which rms are
willing to sell and buy all their capacity in a double version of the stepwise auction setting. Examples
include the papers by Richter and Sheblé (1998), Nicolaisen et. al. (2001), Bunn and Oliveira (2001,
2003) and Rupérez Micola and Bunn (2008).
However, many behavioural simulations use aggregate demands. The literature often models short-
run electricity demand as inelastic, in part due to the lack of real-time metering systems. Examples
include Bagnall and Smith (2005), Bunn and Martoccia (2005), Cincotti et al (2005), García et al.
(2005), Nanduri and Das (2007), Rupérez Micola et al. (2008) and Sun and Tesfatsion (2007). At rst
glance, this may seem like an appropriate representation of reality, but there are several reasons why
relaxing that assumption can add value. First, markets have some level of bid-in demand, or implicit
elasticity provided through the actions of system operators who may take out-of-market actions to
e¤ectively reduce demand when prices rise. Second, most volume is traded outside of balancing
markets, either in exchanges or bilaterally. Third, nancial derivatives increase demand elasticity.
Finally, inelastic demand models tend to present a large number of non-Pareto ranked pure strategy
equilibria. Papers with elastic demands include several by Derek Bunn and coauthors (e.g. Bower and
Bunn, 2000, 2001; Bower et al., 2001; Bunn and Oliveira, 2007, 2008; Day and Bunn, 2001), and also
Veit et al. (2006).
To our knowledge, only Banal-Estanol and Rupérez Micola (2009), Li et al. (2009) and Visudhiphan
and Ilic (1999) use both elastic and inelastic demands. Still, they do not seek to explicitly explore the
implications of the elasticity assumption.
2.3 Behavioural algorithm
Behavioural simulation models require rules to govern rm behaviour. One of their main intentions
is to realistically represent human decision-making, and its proponents frequently argue that existing
deductive mechanisms often do poorly in experiments (Camerer and Ho, 1999, Roth and Erev, 1995;
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and van Huyck et al., 1990, are regularly used to support this claim). The electricity behavioural
simulations literature is based on adaptive learning algorithms mainly derived from psychology.
Some previous work uses reinforcement learning (RL). In RL, rms tend to repeat actions that
led to positive outcomes and avoid those that were detrimental. Several papers have used modied
versions of the Roth and Erev (1995) algorithm, e.g. Banal-Estanol and Rupérez Micola (2009), Li
et al. (2009), Nanduri and Das (2007), Nicolaisen et al. (2001), Rupérez Micola and Bunn (2008),
Rupérez Micola et al. (2008), Sun and Tesfatsion (2007) and Veit et al. (2006). It is based on the
law of e¤ect, whereby actions that result in more positive consequences are more likely to be repeated
in the future, and on the law of practice, whereby learning curves tend to be steep initially and then
atten out. These are robust properties observed in the literature on human learning. One of RLs
main strengths is that one does not need to make assumptions on the information that players have
about each others strategies, history of play and the payo¤ structure. This is consistent with the
fact that, in many cases, electricity traders cannot observe one anothers current strategies, and only
imperfectly infer them from volatile prices. However, RL might be too simplistic to fully capture the
strategic opportunities available to humans (Erev et al., 2007; Ert and Erev, 2007).
It is likely that players in reality engage in more sophisticated behaviour like best response to
their competitors actions. There are two main types of best response algorithms: ctitious play (FP)
and "Cournot" best response (BR).2 In FP (Brown, 1951), each player assumes that her opponents
play stationary, possibly mixed, strategies. In each round, the player best responds to her opponents
empirical frequency of play. Electricity studies using FP include those by Bunn and Oliveira (2001,
2003) and García et al. (2005). BR implies that the player only responds to her opponents move
in the directly precedent period. BR papers include those by Bunn and Oliveira (2007, 2008) and
Day and Bunn (2001) and Bunn and Day (2009).3 To our knowledge, there is no research on whether
the results obtained with RL, FP and BR di¤er substantially in the electricity context. The use of
weighted ctitious play, power choice rules and regret models may improve the models quality.
Finally, most papers do not report initial conditions. In those that do, the standard approach is to
use a uniform initial probability distribution for all elements of the action space (e.g. Rupérez Micola
and Bunn, 2008), Rupérez Micola et al., 2008) and Banal-Estanol and Rupérez Micola, 2009). We are
not aware of any papers explicitly exploring alternative starting conditions.
2The term "Cournot" does not refer to quantity bidding but to the classic tatônnement process leading to equilibrium.
To avoid confusion, we refer to this algorithm as "best response" (BR).
3Several papers depart from those models. Bower and Bunn (2000, 2001), Bower et al. (2001) and Bunn and Martoccia
(2005) all use local adjustment. Bagnall and Smith (2005) use hierarchical classier systems and Richter and Sheblé
(1998) use genetic algorithms.
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3 Modelling specications
Our model incorporates key features of electricity markets in the short-run. Although it could be easily
extended to become more complex, it is stylised to facilitate the exposition as well as the comparison
between theoretical predictions and simulation results. We rst present the market structure and
trading rules that form our framework. Then, we describe the alternative parameter implementations
of demand, supply and rm behaviour, which yield many of the literatures models as particular cases.
3.1 Market structure and trading rules
Let there be n symmetric generators, i = 1; :::; n, with constant marginal production costs, c, up to
capacity. Denoting the market capacity as K, the individual capacity of each rm is kn = K=n. For a
given K, n parametrises the degree of competition in the market, as the individual capacities decrease
with the number of generators.
Prices are bounded between marginal costs and 	, with 	 being the maximum reasonable price
cap (e.g. Lin et al., 2009). This can be understood as a limit triggering regulatory intervention or
the cost of alternative, expensive load fuels to which the system administrator could switch at short
notice. It also reects high cost back-up power generation facilities owned by many industrial users.
Although relevant in the long term, we do not deal with capacity expansion, long-term contracts,
ancillary and capacity payments. For ease of comparison to existing research, we have also left out
the network issues inherent in the operations of electricity utilities, i.e. we assume an un-congested
network as is done in most of the existing simulations literature.
Trading takes place through a compulsory, uniform-price auction. Suppliers simultaneously submit
individual schedules. An independent auctioneer adds them horizontally and creates an ad hoc market
supply function. Then she intersects it with the market demand and determines the uniform price bp.
Finally, she assigns individual quantities, qi; to each of the bidders. Prots for each rm are
i = (bp  c)  qi for i = 1; :::; n: (1)
3.2 Demand representations
We accommodate di¤erent demand levels and elasticities. Demand, Q(p), can be inelastic or price-
sensitive. In the inelastic case, demand is equal to a constant quantity Q for any price between zero
and 	, i.e. a vertical line at Q, Q(p)  Q. We rotate this curve to obtain linear functions with
di¤erent elasticities at the same point. We denote the vertical coordinate of the rotation point as v
(0  v  	) and the deviation to the left of Q at the price cap level as u (0  u  Q). Thus, all
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demand curves are linear, pass through ( Q; v) and ( Q  u;	) and can be written as
Q(p)  Q 
u
(	  v)
(p  v):
In all cases, market demand is assumed to lead to system overcapacity, i.e. Q(p) < K for all p.
Figure 1 of the Supplementary Appendix shows examples of demand with Q = 8, 	 = 20, v = 10 and
u = 0; 0:5; and 1. The three demands are Q(p) = 8 (u = 0, in purple), Q(p) = 8  0:510 (p 10) (u = 0:5,
in magenta), and Q(p) = 8  110(p  10) (u = 1, in red).
3.3 Supply representations
Supply schedules vary along two dimensions. First, rms are allowed to submit either at bids (step-
wise bidding case) or increasing supply schedules (SF bidding case). Second, in line with Day
and Bunn, 2001, and Hobbs and Pang, 2007, we consider multi-step schedules. We divide each rms
capacity into m equally-sized capacity bins, kn=m. We use alternative values of m in the stepwise and
supply bidding cases. We now provide details for each case and explain the market clearing process.
Stepwise bidding The feasible price o¤er domain is approximated by a discrete grid. Generators
choose from S possible bids, equally spaced between c and 	, at which they are willing to supply each
bins capacity. That is, the set of possible bids is
Sm(q)  fc+ s (	  c) =S j s = 1; :::; S g :
Each possible bid corresponds to an action or choice variable s. Bids generated from lower actions
are closer to c, i.e. more competitive. The individual schedules for each bin are at but rms can
submit multi-step schedules if m > 1.
Supply function bidding Supply schedules are non-decreasing. For each bin, the generators choose
among S possible angles, s = 1; :::; S, equally spaced between 0 and =2 radians. The schedules consist
of the linear curves from (0; c) until (kn=m; b(s)), capped at 	,
Sm(q) 

min(c+
b(s)  c
kn=m
q;	) j s = 1; :::; S

;
where
b(s) = c+
sin(s (=2) =S)
cos(s (=2) =S)
kn=m:
The angle of the plants supply schedule, s, is the action and therefore the choice variable. Schedules
generated from lower actions are more competitive because they are atter. The supply function for
the lowest action (s = 1) is almost at at c. The supply function when s = S is the result of capping
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a vertical linear function at the origin.4 Schedules generated from high actions become at at 	. Note
that the amounts sold by each rm are always strictly positive.
Market clearing The auctioneer intersects the market demand and supply functions to set bp. Under
stepwise bids, she gives full capacity to bids below bp; the remaining capacity to those equal to bp (in
case of a tie, the selling bin is selected randomly); and zero to the bids above bp. Under SF bidding,
she assigns full capacity to the parts of each schedule below bp. Parts above bp receive nothing. The
Supplementary Appendix includes a formal derivation of the market clearing process. The two panels
in Figure 1 of the Supplementary Appendix show hypothetical bidding examples with n = 2, m = 1,
K = 10, 	 = 20, and c = 0. The market supply function (black line) is the horizontal addition of the
individual functions (blue and green).
3.4 Firm behaviour representations
We use the Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) adaptive learning mechanism (Camerer and Ho,
1999). This behavioural model nests RL, FP and BR as special cases. It assumes that each feasible
action of each bin has a numerical attraction. The attractions generate a bin-specic probability distri-
bution. In each round, generators submit supply schedules according to these bin-specic probability
distributions. Once the market clears, the attractions are adjusted with the behavioural rule and
mapped into new probability distributions. This process is repeated until the simulation converges.
We now describe how rms use experience to update the attractions, and how these lead to choice
probabilities. Then we specify the initial attractions and the convergence denition.
Updating rules and choice probabilities Each action s for bin j in generator i has an attraction
Aji;s(t) > 0 after period t ( 1). Attractions are updated according to
Aji;s(t) =
N(t  1)Aji;s(t  1) +
h
 + (1  )I(s; rji )
i
i(s; r
 j
i )
N(t)
; (2)
where rji and r
 j
i denote the action taken in period t by bin j of rm i and by the rest of the bins,
respectively; I(x; y) is an indicator function with value 1 if x = y and 0 if x 6= y; N(t) = N(t  1)+1
with N(0) = 0, representing the number of observation-equivalents of past experience; and the
EWA parameters , , and  denote the weight placed on foregone payo¤s, a discount factor to
depreciate previous attractions, and a discount factor that weights the impact of previous against
future experience, respectively.
When  = 0 and  = 0, EWA behaves like the widely used class of RL models (e.g. Roth-
Erev, 1995). RL models are based on the law of e¤ect, whereby actions that result in more positive
4We add a marginal amount to the denominator to avoid indeterminacy when s = S.
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consequences are more likely to be repeated in the future, and on the law of practice, whereby learning
curves tend to be steep initially and then atten out. When  = 1, and  = , EWA is equivalent
to the standard weighted belief-based models. In particular, it produces BR when  =  = 0 and
FP when  =  = 1. In BR dynamics, players actions are determined by the best response to what
her opponents did in the immediately preceding period, so that only the most recent observation
counts. In FP, each player best responds to the empirical frequency of play of her opponents since the
beginning of the game, and all observations count equally.
Camerer and Ho (1999) estimated several parameters in stylised games, and preferred models
that fall between the three extreme examples. We focus mainly on the extreme RL, BR and FP
parametrizations for ease of comparison to the electricity literature. In the last section of the results,
we also consider an alternative regret model similar to the one in Erev and Ert (2007) and Marchiori
and Warglien (2008).
As is done is most of the electricity literature, we linearly map attractions into action choice
probabilities. The probability of selecting an action in the next period is its attraction divided by the
sum of attractions for all actions,
P ji;s(t+ 1) =
Aji;s(t)
Sk=1A
j
i;k(t)
: (3)
Note that this is a particular case of the power probability function used by Camerer and Ho (1999) in
which the exponent is equal to one. In the same paper, Camerer and Ho (1999) also propose a power
function, which we employ in the last section of our analysis.
Prior beliefs and initial conditions The probabilities in the rst period, P ji;s(1), are generated
from prior values of the attractions, Aji;s(0). As explained by Camerer and Ho (1999), the prior values
of the attractions may reect pre-game experience. We construct Aji;s(0) from four representative
assumptions on prior beliefs. We assume that rms believe that the others will initially (i) choose the
highest possible bid (s = S), (ii) choose the mid-point of the range (s = S=2), (iii) choose the lowest
possible action (s = 1), or (iv) use a uniform distribution over all their actions. In each of the four
treatments, Aji;s(0) for all i and j is dened as the hypothetical prot that each action s would render
if prior beliefs about the opponents were correct.
Figure 2 in the Supplementary Appendix reports the impact of prior beliefs on the initial probabili-
ties in markets with one and twelve rms (assuming stepwise bidding, m = 1, K = 10, 	 = 20, S = 50
and c = 0). Actions are identied on the horizontal axis. Firms will use mixed strategies unless the
probability of playing all but one action is zero. Probabilities concentrated on higher actions result in
less competitive bids and vice-versa. By denition, prior beliefs on others have no impact when there
is only one rm.
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To our knowledge, the literature only includes uniform initial probability distributions over all the
elements of the action space, which implicitely implies that rms believe that their opponents will bid
	. Thus, take the case of twelve rms. In treatment (i), that is when rms believe that their opponents
will initially bid 	, they think that any bid below 	 would allow them to sell full capacity at 	. Hence
all the actions below S have initial attractions equal to the maximum prots, i.e. Aji;s(0) = 	kn for all
s < S, and the same initial probability, P ji;s(1) 
1
S 1 . In treatment (ii), when rms believe that others
will initially bid the minimum price (s = 1), any bid above the minimum would be out-of-the-money
and earn them zero prots. Therefore, the initial attractions are concentrated on s = 1 and therefore
P ji;1(1) = 1 and P
j
i;s(1) = 0 for s > 1. In treatment (iii), when rms assume the others will initially
bid in the middle of the distribution, they randomise over their lower half and assign zero probability
in the upper half. Finally, in treatment (iv), when players assume that the others will initially follow a
uniform distribution, they bid more competitively than if they used a uniform distribution, assigning
higher probability to lower prices.
Convergence We dene convergence in terms of strategy proles (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1998,
for a literature overview). A simulation run has converged if the maximum per-period change in the
probability of playing any strategy is below a (small) threshold.
Denition 1 For a given  (small), a simulation run has converged to a mixed strategy prole z in
period t if for any potential action prole a in period t+ 1, the probability distribution adjustment of
any action s of any bin j of any generator i is such that
P ji;s(t+ 1)  P ji;s(t) < : (4)
The simulation price is computed from the rms mixed strategy prole z.
In practice, we select the action with the lowest probability in period t. Then, we compute the
hypothetical probability that would result from assigning maximum prots to this action and minimum
prots to all the other actions. The simulation has not converged as long as the di¤erence between
present and future probabilities is higher than  . It has converged when it is lower. The smaller  ,
the more stringent the threshold and the higher the necessary t.
Once there is convergence, we calculate expected end-of-simulation prices from the individual
probability distributions. Note that convergence is compatible with the survival of several feasible
trading actions, as in mixed strategies. Price volatility may not be equal to zero even if there is a
steady state. Moreover, EWA bidding depends on the stochastic process and, as a result, simulation
runs for the same parameters might lead to di¤erent end prices, i.e. the standard deviation of mean
prices across simulations is not necessarily zero.
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4 Theoretical predictions
We now derive predictions on the e¤ect of competition on market prices. The predicted market prices
shall depend on the number of pivotal plants (see e.g. Genc and Reynolds, 2005; Entriken and
Wan, 2005; Banal-Estanol and Ruperez Micola, 2009). A rm is pivotal if it is necessary to satisfy the
quantity in demand. In the inelastic case, the denition is straightforward as the demand is constant,
but in the elastic case, the quantity demanded depends on the supply bids. In general, one has to
dene pivotality for an exogenous demand level.
Denition 2 A rm i is pivotal for a given level of demand Q0 if this level exceeds the sum of
production capacities of all other rms, i.e. if j 6=ikn = (n  1)kn < Q
0.
Pivotal dynamics are simple in symmetric settings. In markets with few rms, they are all pivotal.
In those featuring many rms, none is pivotal. We next dene the level of competition at which the
number of pivotal rms changes.
Denition 3 A level of competition n^l is a lower switching point if (i) all rms are pivotal at the
minimum demand (Q0 = Q(	)) for n < n^l and (ii) none of them is for n  n^l:
Denition 4 A level of competition n^u is an upper switching point if (i) all rms are pivotal at
the maximum demand (Q0 = Q(c)) for n < n^u and (ii) none of them is for n  n^u.
If demand is inelastic, the upper and lower switching points coincide and, for simplicity, we call
them the switching point. For example, if Q(p) = 8 for any p and K = 10, the switching point is
n^u = n^l = 5 because if n < 5; (n  1)kn < 8; and all rms are necessary to fulll demand but no rm
is pivotal when n  5, (n  1)kn  8.
In the elastic case, the upper and lower switching points are di¤erent. Take for instance the case
in which 	 = 20, v = 10, Q = 8, u = 1, c = 0 and K = 10. The minimum and maximum demands
are Q(20) = 7 and Q(0) = 9. There is a lower switching point at n^l = 4 since (n  1)kn < 7 = Q(20)
for n < 4 and (n   1)kn  7 = Q(20) for n  4 and an upper switching point at n^
u = 1 because
(n  1)kn < 9 = Q(0) for n < 1 and (n  1)kn  9 = Q(0) for n  1.
Proposition 5 (a) For each K; Q(p), there exists a unique upper switching point, n^u = K= (K  Q(c)).
(b) If the number of rms is lower than this threshold (n < n^u), then any given rm i bidding
pm(n), where p

m(n) is the monopoly price of the residual demand curve, p

m(n)  argmax0p	f(p 
c) [Q(p)  (n  1)kn]g; is part of any equilibrium. The equilibrium price is p

m(n).
(c) If the number of rms is higher than this threshold (n  n^u), then all rms bidding c is an
equilibrium. The equilibrium price is c:
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The equilibrium price drops from the monopoly price of the residual demand to competitive levels
at n^u. It is unique if n = 1 < n^u (monopoly) and if n > n^u (marginal cost pricing). If 1 < n < n^u,
however, there are multiple pure strategy equilibria with many payo¤-equivalent actions as part of
each of them.5 Consider, for example, the case of two rms, inelastic demand, one bin and stepwise
bidding. A generator bidding 	 and the other bidding close to c, or vice versa, are both equilibria
in which one obtains a low prot and the other gets the maximum. The situation is similar to the
battle of the sexes game. Coordination in this game can be low (Cooper et al., 1990), and especially
di¢cult due to the payo¤ asymmetry in each of the equilibria (Crawford et al., 2008). If 1 < n < n^u,
market prices are expected to be at most pm(n) but can be substantially lower because of multiple
equilibria and coordination issues. The next corollary shows that a higher n decreases the equilibrium
price pm(n) and increases equilibrium prot asymmetries. This will further reduce the rms incentive
to be the price-setter, and induce them to submit lower bids.
Corollary 6 If the number of rms below the threshold (n < n^u),
(a) the equilibrium price (pm(n)) is non-increasing in n
(b) the relative prots of a price-setting rm with respect to a non-price setting rm in the equilibria
((pm   c) [Q(p

m)  (n  1)kn] = [(p

m   c)kn]) decrease in n.
The proposition and the corollary allow us to sketch predictions about the e¤ect of competition
on prices. Monopoly prices should be equal to pm(1) as this leads to maximum prots. Prices should
decrease in n as long as the rms are pivotal at the minimum demand, n < n^u, due to lower equilibrium
prices and growing prot asymmetries. Prices should drastically decrease at the upper switching point
(n^u) because the unique prediction is that prices are equal to marginal costs for n > n^u.
Prediction 7 The dynamics pre- and post-switching point result in nonlinearities in the inuence
of n on prices. Pre n^u, prices decrease with n from the monopoly price, pm(1). Post n^
u, prices are
drastically reduced to c.
Note that this prediction is not specic to any of the supply, demand, and behavioural assumptions
that we explore in this paper. Further, there is wide consensus on the importance of pivotal dynamics
in real electricity markets (for a discussion on the role of pivotal dynamics, see e.g. Rothkopf, 2002).
The prediction is so standard that any combination of modelling assumptions aiming to reproduce
spot electricity markets should be able to fulll it.
5 Simulations
We rst introduce the simulation parameters. and graphically compare the simulation outcomes with
the theory. Then, we formally test whether the data for each specication features breaking points at
5There are also many mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
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the predicted locations and, whether the predicted switching point is best-tting.
5.1 Parameters
We allow the number of rms, which parametrises the degree of competition, to vary from one to
twelve, 1  n  12. Marginal costs are set to zero, c = 0. Total capacity is K = 10, so individual
capacities decrease from k1 = 10 to k12 = 0:833. The price ceiling is 	 = 20, with a grid of S = 50
possible actions and a demand rotation point v = 10. The convergence parameter is  = 0:004: We
focus on the demand, supply and behaviour assumptions in turn. We use as a reference specication
an inelastic demand with 20% excess capacity (u = 0 and Q = 8), rms using stepwise bidding with
one bin (m = 1), and rms learning following RL with a uniform initial distribution.
To study the e¤ect of the demand assumptions, we x the reference supply (stepwise bidding and
m = 1) and behavioural representations (RL and uniform initial distribution). We run simulations for
the combinations of expected demand levels Q = f8; 8:5; 9g and elasticity parameters u = f0; 0:5; 1g:
We perform 50 simulations for each n and for each combination of demand level and elasticity para-
meters. The data set includes 3  3  12  50 = 5; 400 observations.
When we focus on the supply side, we x the demand ( Q = 8 and u = 0) and behavioural
specications (RL and uniform initial distribution). We perform simulations for each, the stepwise and
supply function bidding, and for one, two and three bins. The resulting data includes 231250 = 3; 600
observations.
For the behavioural analysis, we x the supply and demand specications (stepwise, m = 1, Q = 8
and u = 0). We perform simulations for each, BR, RL and FP, and for prior beliefs equal to 	, 0,
	=2 and random. In total, there are 3  4  12  50 = 7; 200 observations in the data set.
From Proposition 5, the monopoly prices are equal to the maximum price, pm(1) = 	 = 20. The
upper switching points are bnu = f5; 6; 10g, respectively for Q = f8; 8:5; 9g, if u = 0 (inelastic demand),
and bnu = f7; 10; 12g if u = 0:5 and bnu = f10; 12; 12g if u = 1:
5.2 Simulation results
Figures 1, 2 and 3 compare the impact of competition on prices for the di¤erent demand, supply
and behavioural specications. Each panel plots the long-run average price (p) and two standard
deviations across the 50 simulation runs for each n. Since the theoretical price predictions are corner
solutions, the intervals sometimes exceed the simulation boundaries. The upper-left panel in each
gure corresponds to the same reference specication ( Q = 8, u = 0; stepwise bidding, m = 1, RL and
a uniform initial distribution).
Demand specications Figure 1 reports the demand results. Simulations use as demand levels
Q = 8; 8:5 or 9 (in columns one, two and three, respectively) and, as elasticity assumptions, u = 0;
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0:5, or 1 (in rows one, two and three). In all the panels, the supply and behavioural assumptions are
one-bin stepwise bidding and RL with uniform initial distribution.
Monopoly prices are close to 	(= 20) and the relationship between n and p is decreasing. In the
inelastic cases (u = 0, rst row), p drops rapidly in n but attens out around n = 5; n = 6 and
n = 10, respectively for Q = f8; 8:5; 9g. More competition has a small e¤ect beyond those values, but
p remains clearly above c, particularly in the case of tight capacity ( Q = 9, third column).
In the elastic cases (second and third rows), the theory predicted a break at the upper switching
points: bnu = f7; 10; 12g for u = 0:5 and bnu = f10; 12; 12g for u = 1 for Q = f8; 8:5; 9g, respectively.
That is, as elasticity increases, we predict a break for higher levels of n. Instead, the simulations show
a lower breaking point as the elasticity increases, particularly under tight capacity. As we will see,
this is consistent with a break at the lower switching point.
Comparing simulation results across specications, the impact of the elasticity seems to be, at
best, modest. Simulations are similar across rows, in terms of both price levels and the shape of the
n to p relationship. However, under tight capacity, a higher elasticity seems to make the price more
sensitive to n. Across demand levels, p tends to be less sensitive to n as the levels of demand increase.
Higher demand levels also lead to higher overall prices. This is also consistent with Proposition 5,
which predicts that equilibrium prices are increasing in Q (higher bnu and higher pm).
Overall, the demand results are quite, but not perfectly, consistent with the theory. First, although
monopoly prices are close to 	 and the relationship between n and p is decreasing, post-threshold prices
are far from c. Second, inelastic simulations t the break predictions better than those with elasticity.
Third, smaller excess capacity (K   Q) results in higher prices. Fourth, results do not vary too much
within our elasticity ranges, which are comparable to those in the literature.
Supply specications Figure 2 reports the bidding assumption results. Simulations use stepwise
(rst row) or SF bidding (second row) with one, two or three bins (columns one, two and three). We
use Q = 8 and u = 0 and RL with uniform initial distribution in all cases.
As predicted, the relationship between n and p monotonously decreases both for the stepwise and
the SF assumptions. Its shape changes around n = 5, consistent with the prediction of a switching
point at bnu = 5. In the stepwise case, however, prices remain above the competitive levels after the
threshold. ps sensitivity to n decreases with the number of bins and therefore the deviation from
theory grows. When m = 1, post-switching point prices are around 4, when m = 2 around 7 or 8 and
when m = 3 around 10. If there are multiple bins, rms are able to use some of their bins to keep
prices high while recouping some of the benets of high prices with the other bins.
Although the price variability increases, SF yields a better t in terms of average prices. This is
probably because its higher expressiveness overcomes the di¢culties to coordinate in the theoretical
prediction. The standard deviation grows in m, especially around the switching point. Under SF,
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bids above the equilibrium price may be reinforced because they also obtain substantial prots. It
is therefore more di¢cult for rms to tell good from bad bids and dispersion grows. In comparison,
stepwise bids are either on- or out-of-the-money. Hence it is easier to identify the good bids and the
simulations become crisper. Overall, prices are less sensitive to n under stepwise bidding and SF is
better at capturing the extreme monopoly and competitive predictions. Still, SFs price dispersions
increase substantially around the pivotal breaks.
Behavioural specications Figure 3 reports simulation results for the di¤erent behavioural spec-
ications (assuming stepwise bidding with m = 1, and Q = 8 and u = 0). RL is on the top, BR in the
middle and FP in the bottom panel. The four columns correspond to the four prior belief assumptions
in the following order: (i) the maximum price, (ii) randomly, (iii) the minimum price, and (iv) the
medium point. This implies that the initial probability distributions are uniform, lower than uniform,
concentrated in the lowest action, and uniform over the bottom half, respectively.
All condence intervals are narrow. In reinforcement learning (rst row), monopoly prices are close
to 	, decrease until the theoretical switching point (bnu = 5) and approach c after it. The RL break
at the switching point is striking only if the prior is competitive (third column).
The pre-break relationships between n and p are not decreasing for BR and FP. In BR (second
row), monopoly prices are far from 	 (at about 14), but there is a clear breaking point for n = 5,
after which they converge exactly to c. Initial conditions do not have an impact under BR due to the
algorithms lack of memory.
The di¤erences between RL and BR can be traced back to the algorithms features. Under BR,
prices have been shown to be competitive when no rm is pivotal. This is because under BR, the
attractions of all the actions above those used by the other rms in the previous period are reduced
to zero. Therefore rms choose lower actions and p can only stay constant or decrease. The resulting
unravelling yields p = c. When all rms are pivotal, equilibrium forces tend to increase p so that rms
choose high actions with some probability. Simultaneously, unravelling prevents p from staying very
high. On balance, p never reaches 	, not even in monopoly, and may even increase slightly. In RL,
instead, there are no in-built unravelling and best-response mechanisms. Actions above those of the
opponents are still played because they might have generated prots in earlier periods. Thus, p is
higher than under BR for all n.
Fictitious play (third row) departs signicantly from the predictions. Monopoly prices are around
14, are slightly increasing in n and stay patently above competitive levels. FP keeps most of the initial
noise as it weights heavily initial periods with quasi-random outcomes. Firms assign propensities
to inadequate actions, adaptation slows down and there is strong path dependence. There are two
countervailing forces at work. On the one hand, the higher n the more likely it is that there will be
unravelling as in the case of best response. On the other hand, initial random prices are more likely
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to be high if there are more rms, so that reductions start from a higher base. Monopoly prices are
far from 	 because of unravelling. Prices when no rm is pivotal are far from zero owing to high
initial prices. They are not decreasing due to the in-built best-response features of the algorithm. On
balance, the n to p relationship is quite at and stays far from the theory extremes.
Overall, RL best matches the theory but is not as reactive to market conditions as BR. FP performs
worst. Competitive prior beliefs render by far the most homogeneous post-switching prices across
behavioural assumptions. This is because beliefs are self-fullling. Everyones best response is to bid
c when they believe that the others will bid c. BR and FP lock themselves up in that value while
experimentation in RL is not powerful enough to depart from it. The theoretical soundness of RL
with competitive initial beliefs is strikingly good and the best of the twelve. Monopoly prices are only
slightly below 	, and decrease clearly in n for n < 5, so that prices are above 10. For n > 5, prices
converge to c. These results are to our knowledge the rst on the robustness of simulation techniques
to behavioural choices in electricity markets.
5.3 Threshold regressions
In this section, we carry out tests of whether the simulation data conrm our hyptheses. We estimate
a piecewise linear model between n and p for each demand, supply and behavioural combination. The
models are uniquely specied by a dummy variable associated with the upper switching point bnu;
pi = 0 + 1Di + 2ni + 3Dini + ui, where Di = 0 if ni < bnu, Di = 1 when ni  bnu: (5)
The pre- and post-breaking points regression estimates are specied by
E(pijDi = 0; ni) = 0 + 2ni and E(pijDi = 1; ni) = (0 + 1) + (2 + 3)ni:
We test rst the null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of structural breaks at the pivotal
switching points bnu. Evidence supporting the existence of a breaking point can come either from
signicant intercept or slope change coe¢cients, i.e. 1 and 3 di¤erent from zero. Second, we test
whether prices are decreasing in the number of rms before the breaking point and atter thereafter,
i.e. 2 negative and 3 positive.
Table 2 reports the results on the demand, supply and behavioural assumptions. On the left-hand
side of each block, we specify the parameters used in each specication, together with the implied
upper switching point. The parameters changing in each block are in boxes. The right-hand side
reports regression estimates. The coe¢cients correspond to equation (5).
In all cases, either 1 or 3 (or both) is signicant at standard levels. There are three non-signicant
coe¢cients (one 1, two 3) but the other coe¢cient in the same specication is always signicative.
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The tests provide support for the rst hypothesis. However, both best-response and cticious play
exhibit increasing rms-price relationships before the breaking point, i.e. 2 > 0. Reinforcement
learning, on the other hand, satises the second hypothesis. It displays a negative relationship before
the breaking point and a atter relationship thereafter, as predicted by the theory.
5.4 Weighted ctitious play, power choice rules and regret models
We now check whether the poor performance of the belief-based models (BR, FP) is due to the
particular specications used in the available electricity models. The preceeding work in this literature
motivated three simplications:
First, we have used extreme behavioral assumptions about how agents form beliefs about others
behavior. Players either disregard all periods except the last one (BR) or give equal weight to all of
them (FP). We consider now an alternative weighted ctitious play rule (WFP). Under this assump-
tion, agents consider all their previous experience, but their opponents earlier behavior carries less
weight than more recent behavior. Second, we have assumed a linear probability choice rule, a partic-
ular type of the power probability rule proposed by Camerer and Ho (1999). As an alternative, we also
study their exponential probability rule. Third, we have not considered alternative behavioural rules
based on recent additions to the literature. For example, Ert and Erev (2007) and Marchioria and
Warglien (2008) include some regret-based feedback and argue that it might more accurately predict
actual human behavior in games with mixed strategy equilibria.
In this section, we address the three alternative specications. We use our baseline case (stepwise
bidding with m = 1, and Q = 8, u = 0 with uniform initial distribution) for the WFP model ( = 1
and  =  2 (0; 1)), both with linear and exponential probability rules, and with and without regret.
We use a model with an exponential regret-based choice rule, similar to Ert and Erevs (2007) model,
and use their estimated parameter combinations in the benchmark specication. Our implementation
assumes that each action s for bin j in generator i is updated with
P ji;s(t+ 1) =
eA
j
i;s(t)=
j
i (t)
Sk=1e
Aj
i;k
(t)=ji (t)
; (6)
where ji (t) is the regret parameter. 
j
i (t) is updated according to
ji (t) = 1 +
N(t  1)ji (t  1) + maxsfi(s; r
 j
i )g   i(r
j
i ; r
 j
i )
N(t)
; (7)
where rji and r
 j
i denote again the action taken in period t by bin j of rm i and by the rest of the
bins, respectively, and ji (0) = 1.
Figure 4 provides the simulation results. The rst row reports simulations of the WFP model
with a linear choice rule, as in (3). The WFP specications are, from left to right,  = 0:52 (as
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estimated in Ert and Erev, 2007),  = 0:25 and  = 0:75. The simulation outcomes are similar to
each other and to those under BR ( = 0) (second row, rst column in Figure 3). Prices are close to
the competitive levels after a breaking point. However, they are not sensitive to the number of rms
before the breaking point and far from the maximum (	), even under monopoly. Prices are not as
close to the competitive levels as in BR, especially when  = 0:75, but clearly closer than under FP
( = 1).
The second row provides the results of the WFP model with an exponential choice rule, as in (6),
but without regret (that is, ji (t) = 1 for all t and i and j). We assume  = 0:52 and, from left to
right,  = 2:75 (as estimated in Ert and Erev, 2007),  = 1 and  = 5. Prices are decreasing and close
to 	 under monopoly. Still, post-breaking point prices are high, particularly when  = 1. Also, the
condence intervals for  = 2:75 and  = 5 are quite wide around the breaking point.
The third row provides the results of the WFP model with an exponential choice rule, as in (6),
with regret (ji (t) updated with (7)). We use the same parameters as in the second row ( = 0:52 and,
from left to right,  = 2:75,  = 1 and  = 5). Condence intervals are narrower than without regret
but the breaking point is less clear, especially for  = 1. Post-breaking point prices also remain well
above competitive levels.
Overall, it seems that one can improve on the basic belief-based algorithms of the electricity
modelling literature. As an illustration, some of alternatives in this section are clearly better than the
previous best-response and ctitious play outcomes. Further tests and renements are necessary but
this evidence indicates that one way to improve the performance of simulations models is by using
experiments to identify the appropriate simulation algorithms.
6 Discussion and conclusions
Firms and regulators alike have started to use behavioural simulations to study the properties of many
markets. However, the literature has advanced little in creating a set of standards. This paper is an
attempt to advance in that direction. We study the properties of di¤erent simulation techniques and
how they compare to each other and to a standard economic theory benchmark. As a case in point,
we focus on a well-established claim in the wholesale electricity auctions literature. Any model should
be able to replicate it.
The demand, supply, and, particularly, behavioural comparisons call into question an important
part of the extant behavioural literature on electricity markets. Reinforcement learning performs quite
well, but best-response and especially ctitious play do not. Prior beliefs and initial conditions have an
inuence on the performance of the simulations. Competitive pre-game beliefs render the best match
to theory. Flat and upward slopping supply functions yield similar results, and also several plausible
elasticity assumptions. The simulations are inuenced by the number of bids per plant. Simulations
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perform best when they combine inelastic demand, reinforcement learning, competitive initial beliefs
and single-bin bids.
The paper has several implications. First, some preceding work makes choices that are not con-
sistent with economic theory in our simple setting. Second, future models should incorporate more
systematic robustness tests. Third, we have not included all possible assumptions. For example, we
have left out variable marginal costs and behavioural rules like genetic algorithms and Q-learning that
are also prominent, and we have not compared the implications of di¤erent convergence denitions.
Fourth, our strongest result relates to ctitious play. Its main di¤erence with best response is mainly
one of memory, so that how much memory to retain and how it should decay, are intriguing, and
still unresolved, algorithmic questions. We have also left out the network congestion issues inherent
in the operations of electricity utilities. Finally, this paper focuses on electricity markets. We should
continue doing similar exercises in other settings, as in Fagiolo et al. (2007), Leombruni et al. (2007),
Marks (2007) and Midgley et al. (2007).
The question of which models t best to real data is complementary to our research and deserves
future attention. The alternative belief-based models proposed in the last section of the paper perform
better than best-response and ctitious play. Empirical and especially experimental research can help
in identifying the appropriate specications to model electricity markets. Still, most researchers would
agree in that there is no single universal set of assumptions that can be applied to all situations. This
is for example one of the interpretations one can draw from Camerer and Hos (1999) behavioural
algorithm. We think that this is a valid option as long as we know the modelling choices implications.
The ACE community has made a lot of progress in recent years and we believe it is now time to take
stock of what has been achieved, consolidate and move forward.
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Figure 1: The influence of demand specifications on prices 
 
Mean (+/- two standard deviations) of prices when demand levels 
are Q = {80, 85, 90} (columns 1,2,3) and elasticities u = {0, 5, 
10} (rows 1,2,3) 
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Figure 2: The influence of supply specifications on prices 
 
Mean (+/- two standard deviations) of prices in the stepwise (upper)
and supply function (lower row) cases with number of bins m = {1, 2, 
3} (columns 1,2,3). 
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
n (number of firms)
p 
(pr
ic
e
)
 
Figure 3: The influence of behavioral assumptions on prices 
 
Mean (+/- two standard deviations) of prices in RL (row 1), BR (2), and FP (3). Prior beliefs 
are max. price (column 1), random (2), min. price (3) and middle of the distribution (4) 
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Figure 4: Some alternative behavioral assumptions and their impact on prices 
 
Mean (+/- two standard deviations) of prices in Weighted Fictitious Play (WFP - row 1, phi 
parameters 0.52; 0.25; 0.75), WFP with power choice rule(row 2, phi 0.52; lambda parameters 
2.75; 1; 5), and WFP, power choice rule and regret (row 3, phi 0.52; lambda parameters 2.75; 
1; 5).   
No. Paper Journal Research question Wholesale supply 
representation
Wholesale demand 
representation
Behavioural algorithm
1 Bagnall and Smith (2005) IEEE-Trans Replication of human behaviour in the 
UK market
Single price bid per firm Inelastic demand Hierarchical classifier 
systems
2 Banal and Rupérez Micola 
(2009)
ManSci Technological diversification and 
pivotal dynamics
Single price bid per plant 
and supply functions
Inelastic and elastic 
demands
Reinforcement learning 
(Roth-Erev)
3 Bower and Bunn (2000) EnJor Uniform price and discriminatory 
auctions
Single price bid per plant Elastic demand Reinforcement learning
4 Bower and Bunn (2001) JEDC Uniform price and discriminatory 
auctions
Single price bid per plant Elastic demand Reinforcement learning
5 Bower et al. (2001) EnPol Industrial consolidation in Germany Single price bid per plant Elastic demand Reinforcement learning
6 Bunn and Martoccia (2005) EnEcon Tacit collusion Single price bid per plant Inelastic demand Reinforcement learning
7 Bunn and Oliveira (2001) IEEE - Trans Provide pricing and strategic insights, 
ahead of NETA's introduction in the 
Price / quantity bid per plant Double-sided call auction Best-response dynamics 
(Fictitious-play) with 
8 Bunn and Oliveira (2003) Annals of OR Test whether two dominant generators
could profitably influence wholesale 
price in the UK
Price / quantity bid per plant Double-sided call auction Combination of best-
response dynamics 
(Fictitious-play) and 
reinforcement learning
9 Bunn and Oliveira (2007) EJOR Co-evolution of plant portfolios and 
spot prices
Quantities bidding Elastic demand Best-response dynamics 
(Cournot)
10 Bunn and Oliveira (2008) OR Co-evolution of plant portfolios and 
spot prices
Quantities bidding Elastic demand Best-response dynamics 
(Cournot)
11 Cincotti et al (2005) Proc. SPIE Effect of market microstructure and 
costs on prices
Supply functions Inelastic demand Reinforcement learning
12 Day and Bunn (2001) JRE Analyse divestures and their impact of 
market power in the UK pool
Piecewise supply functions Elastic demand Best-response dynamics 
(Cournot)
13 Day and Bunn (2009) JEDC Analyse market power in the UK pool Piecewise supply functions Elastic demand Best-response dynamics 
(Cournot)
14 García et al. (2005) OR Dynamic price formation and 
hydropower behaviour
Single price bid per plant Inelastic demand Best-response dynamics 
(Fictitious-play)
15 Nanduri and Das (2007) IEEE-Trans Test of model on a simple electricity 
network
Single price bid per firm Inelastic demand Reinforcement learning 
(Roth-Erev)
16 Nicolaisen et. al. (2001) IEEE-Trans Market structure, market power and 
efficiency
Single price bid per firm Double-sided call auction Reinforcement learning 
(Roth-Erev)
17 Richter and Sheblé (1998) IEEE-Trans Wholesale market simulation Single price bid per firm Double-sided call auction Genetic algorithm
18 Rupérez Micola and Bunn JEBO Horizontal cross-holdings Single price bid per firm Double-sided call auction Reinforcement learning
19 Rupérez Micola et al. (2008) JEBO Vertical integration Single price bid per firm Inelastic demand Reinforcement learning 
(Roth-Erev)
20 Sun and Tesfatsion (2007) CompEcon Interplay among market structure, 
protocols in relation to performance
Inelastic demand Reinforcement learning 
(Roth-Erev)
21 Veit et al. (2006) IJMEM Dynamics in forward and spot 
electricity markets
Quantities bidding Elastic demand Reinforcement learning 
(Roth-Erev)
22 Visudhiphan and Ilic (1999) IEEE meetings Dynamic learning in power markets Single price bid per firm and 
supply functions
Inelastic and elastic 
demands
Best-response dynamics
Table 1. Published papers
The Table includes an alphabetical list of electricity agent-based modeling papers published as journal 
articles, with the year of publication and abbreviated journal title. In addition, the Table briefly summarizes 
the research issue in each paper together with their supply bidding, demand representation and behavioral 
algorithm assumptions. Full citations appear in the references list.  
Demand Estimates
Behavior Bid type No. bins u Qbar
Theory br. 
point Beta0 t-stat. 0 Beta1 t-stat. 1 Beta2 t-stat. 2 Beta3 t-stat. 3 F - stat
RL Stepwise 1 0 80 5 22,6915*** 120,1925 -15,8361*** -68,3801 -3,7236*** -42,6075 3,3883*** 38,14074 6770,1818
RL Stepwise 1 0 85 7 20,6404*** 149,9273 -8,9893*** -33,6750 -1,5780*** -38,0172 1,2370*** 25,5813 3571,9040
RL Stepwise 1 0 90 10 20,1647*** 228,4622 -8,9473*** -16,5035 -1,4150*** -80,9588 1,1326*** 21,1356 4325,2052
RL Stepwise 1 5 80 7 22,1599*** 175,1508 -17,0345*** -69,4377 -3,5936*** -94,2047 3,4454*** 77,5304 6818,3850
RL Stepwise 1 5 85 10 17,4470*** 94,7108 -10,8443*** -9,5838 -1,6442*** -45,0715 1,5931*** 14,2440 929,3660
RL Stepwise 1 5 90 12 19,5195*** 200,8121 -8,9316*** -3,8525 -1,2370*** -78,9680 1,0249*** 5,0782 2651,2966
RL Stepwise 1 10 80 10 15,9032*** 74,4074 -11,8689*** -9,0407 -1,7786*** -42,0241 1,79439*** 13,8278 750,4089
RL Stepwise 1 10 85 12 16,1842*** 80,9220 -10,4379*** -2,1882 -1,2457*** -38,6473 1,2756*** 3,0716 566,0308
RL Stepwise 1 10 90 12 16,4728*** 129,1202 -7,0974*** -2,3325 -1,0007*** -48,6707 0,8540*** 3,2238 961,1434
Supply Estimates
Behavior Bid type No. bins u Qbar
Theory br. 
point Beta0 t-stat. 0 Beta1 t-stat. 1 Beta2 t-stat. 2 Beta3 t-stat. 3 F - stat
RL Stepwise 1 0 80 5 22,7623*** 117,1292 -16,0214*** -67,2072 -3,7875*** -42,1032 3,46129*** 37,8502 6387,31
RL Stepwise 2 0 80 5 22,5093*** 137,7616 -11,9539*** -59,6407 -3,5819*** -47,3575 3,2362*** 42,0915 4698,30
RL Stepwise 3 0 80 5 20,9970*** 152,6804 -8,8664*** -52,5584 -2,5914*** -40,7079 2,3111*** 35,7144 3995,64
RL SF 1 0 80 5 23,8829*** 29,5219 -11,8191*** -11,9099 -3,3377*** -8,9128 2,1521*** 5,6534 698,92
RL SF 2 0 80 5 21,6725*** 21,9375 -7,5188*** -6,2043 -1,5723* -3,4381 0,2282 0,4909 500,63
RL SF 3 0 80 5 20,9316*** 34,3007 -13,7422*** -18,3579 -1,1605 -4,1082 0,4488* 1,5632 1445,53
Behavioural choices Estimates
Behavior Bid type No. bins u Qbar
Theory br. 
point Beta0 t-stat. 0 Beta1 t-stat. 1 Beta2 t-stat. 2 Beta3 t-stat. 3 F - stat
BR Stepwise 1 0 80 5 13,0663*** 19,2451 -3,2282*** -3,8761 0,64344*** 2,0473 -1,5568*** -4,8731 616,48
RL Stepwise 1 0 80 5 23,2553*** 127,6799 -16,4564*** -73,6547 -4,0425*** -47,9472 3,7094*** 43,2801 7348,12
FP Stepwise 1 0 80 5 13,0186*** 55,7207 3,6323*** 12,6736 0,5914*** 5,4685 -1,5801*** -14,3719 1801,16
Table 2: Hypotheses’ tests of breaking point regression estimates
The parameters considered in each simulations batch are marked with boxes. The parameters outside those boxes stay 
constant. The estimates correspond to the threshold equation specified in eq. 5. Beta1 and Beta3 estimate the post-
breaking point changes in intercept and slope. They support the existence of a breaking point when they are statistically 
significant: * significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level. 
